This study used basic personal values to elucidate the motivational meanings of 'left' and 'right' political orientations in 20 representative national samples from the European Social Survey . It also compared the importance of personal values and socio-demographic variables as determinants of political orientation. Hypotheses drew on the different histories, prevailing culture, and socio-economic level of 3 sets of countries-liberal, traditional and post-communist. As hypothesized, universalism and benevolence values explained a left orientation in both liberal and traditional countries and conformity and tradition values explained a right orientation; values had little explanatory power in post-communist countries. Values predicted political orientation more strongly than socio-demographic variables in liberal countries, more weakly in post-communist countries, and about equally in traditional countries. 2 Personal values appear increasingly central to political orientations (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Feldman, 1988; Franklin, Mackie & Valen, 1992) . People use personal values to organize and prioritize their beliefs and feelings regarding political issues, to make and justify political decisions, and to communicate about politics (Caprara, et al., 2006; Feldman, 2003; Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991) .
Personal values appear increasingly central to political orientations (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Feldman, 1988; Franklin, Mackie & Valen, 1992) . People use personal values to organize and prioritize their beliefs and feelings regarding political issues, to make and justify political decisions, and to communicate about politics (Caprara, et al., 2006; Feldman, 2003; Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010; Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock, 1991) .
Numerous scholars see values as the building blocks or principles underlying political ideologies (e.g., Converse, 1964; Feldman, 1988; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz et al., 2010) . Jost et al. (2003) presented a social cognition framework that draws on psychological needs, expressed in values, to account for differences in political orientation.
The current study examines the role of basic personal values in left-right political orientations. It analyzes data from 20 countries that participated in the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS). We address two aspects of the role of values. First, we use people's basic value priorities to shed light on variation in the motivational meaning of the left-right political dimension across countries. This dimension has been used to summarize political agendas in countries around the world, but its meanings may vary across countries and political contexts (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003; Huber & Inglehart, 1995; Knutsen, 1998; Thorisdottir et al., 2007) . Relations of left and right orientations to people's value priorities can reveal the motivational meaning of the left-right dimension.
Second, we assess the relative importance of basic personal values and of sociodemographic variables as determinants of left-right political orientation. Some scholars suggest that values have replaced social structural position and group loyalties as the critical determinants of voting behavior (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004; Caprara et al., 2006; Schwartz, et al., 2010) . They found that personal values accounted for more variance in voting and voting intentions in Italy and the USA than socio-demographic variables did. We test the hypotheses that personal values account for more variance than socio-demographic variables in left-right political orientation in specifiable European countries but not in others.
Basic Personal Values
Studies in political science and political psychology typically refer to core political values (e.g., egalitarianism, civil liberties, limited government) that underlie specific attitudes, preferences, and evaluations in the sphere of politics (e.g., Feldman, 1988) . Such values relate to particular political contexts. Schwartz, et al. (2010) suggest that these values express, in the political domain, more basic personal values that guide people in all domains of life. This study adopts the Schwartz (1992 Schwartz ( , 2006b ) approach to basic personal values that specifies a set of values presumed to cover the full range of human motivations. The values identified in this approach can be applied across different political and historical contexts because they have been shown to apply across many cultures.
A growing consensus defines basic values as cognitive representations of desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or group (Schwartz, 1992 (Schwartz, , 2006b ). People use values as standards to decide whether actions, events, or people are good or bad. As beliefs about what is desirable, they elicit positive or negative feelings when they are activated and pursued or defended. The Schwartz (1992) value theory identifies the following ten broad personal values, each defined in terms of the distinct motivational goals that it expresses.
Power: social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources.
Achievement: personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards.
Hedonism: pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself.
Stimulation: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life.
Self-direction: independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring. all people and for nature.
Benevolence: preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact.
Tradition: respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or religion provide the self.
Conformity: restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.
Security: safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationships, and of self.
The theory further specifies a structure of dynamic relations among the ten values.
Figure 1 depicts this structure as a circular motivational continuum reflecting the conflict and compatibility among values. The closer any two values around the circle, the more compatible their motivations and therefore the more likely that the same action or attitude can express or attain both. The more distant any two values, the more conflicting their motivations and hence the less it is possible for the same action or attitude to express or attain both. This integrated structure of values means that any behavior or attitude that is congruent with one basic value (e.g., a right orientation with power) should also be congruent with the adjacent values in the circle (security and achievement) but in conflict with the opposing values (universalism, benevolence, and self-direction). Thus, the whole integrated structure of values relates systematically to other variables. Figure 1 , the ten values are organized along two bipolar dimensions: (1) Self-enhancement values (power, achievement) that encourage and legitimize the pursuit of self-interest oppose self-transcendence values (universalism, benevolence) that emphasize concern for the welfare of others. (2) Openness values (self-direction, stimulation) that favor change and encourage pursuit of new ideas and experiences oppose conservation values (security, tradition, conformity) that emphasize maintaining the status quo and avoiding threat. Hedonism values share elements of both openness and self-enhancement.
The circular structure of values also reflects another dynamic organizing principle of relevance to political orientations (Schwartz, 2006b) . The values in the bottom half of the circle (Figure 1 ) are based in the need to avoid or control anxiety and threat and to protect the self. Values on the bottom right emphasize avoiding conflict, unpredictability, and change by submitting to others' expectations and passively accepting the status quo. Those on the bottom left emphasize overcoming possible sources of anxiety by gaining dominance or admiration. In contrast, values in the top half of the circle are relatively anxiety free, expressing growth and self-expansion. Those on the top right emphasize promoting the welfare of others. Those on the top left emphasize autonomous self-expression.
Research in over seventy cultural groups has validated the motivationally distinct content of these ten values and the relations of conflict and compatibility among them (Schwartz, 1992 (Schwartz, , 2006b Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004) . These ten basic values are relatively comprehensive; they overlook no major, distinct values that are meaningful across societies (De Clercq, Fontaine, & Anseel, 2008; Schwartz, 2006b) . Therefore, the theory offers a nearuniversal system of values that provides a basis for cross-cultural comparison. Applying this theory reduces the risk of overlooking values that might be politically relevant in some contexts but not others.
Conceptions of the Left-Right Political Orientation
Theorists have sought a limited set of ideological dimensions to capture the apparent variety of political orientations. In doing so, they assume that parties and voters can be located along these dimensions and that their locations indicate their ideological positions, that is, their political orientation (Gunther & Kuan, 2007; Feldman, 2003; Huber & Inglehart, 1995; Knutsen, 1998) . The most popular single-dimension model of political competition is the "left-right" or "liberal-conservative" dimension (e.g., Downs 1957; Jost, Nosek & Gosling, 2008; Lispet, 1960) . This dimension is useful for understanding and organizing political information and for summarizing political programs (Fuchs & Klingeman, 1990) .
Despite its widespread popularity and long tradition, or perhaps because of it, the uses and meanings of the political left-right dimension are controversial. Historically, the right was associated with aristocracy and conservatism, whereas the left was associated with social reform and egalitarianism (Lipset, 1960; Lipset & Rokkan 1967) . However, dramatic social and political changes of the past few decades, most notably the collapse of communism and the emergence of "new politics" issues, have challenged these traditional meanings (e.g., Kitschelt & Hellemans, 1990; Knutsen, 1995b) . Huber and Inglehart (1995) concluded from a survey of 42 societies that the left-right dimension "can be found almost wherever political parties exist, but it is an amorphous vessel whose meaning varies in systematic ways with the underlying political and economic conditions" (p. 91).
Liberal, Traditional, and Post-Communist Countries
We postulate that both the meaning of the left-right dimension and the relative importance of personal values and of socio-demographics in accounting for stances on this dimension differ across three sets of countries in the ESS. These sets of countries differ in their political history and culture. We derive hypotheses regarding relations of values with political orientations from the distinctive characteristics of each of these sets of countries.
Liberal Countries. Eleven countries share a political tradition of liberal democracy and welfare-state systems: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These countries fit what Gunther and Kuan (2007) call the 'West European Template' that derived from two major revolutions, the French revolution and the industrial revolution. On the one hand, a right political orientation emerged that defended the old regimes and sought to maintain the hierarchical social order (Gunther & Kuan, 2007; Jost, Nosek & Gosling, 2008; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) . On the other hand, a left political orientation emerged that emphasized equality among all human beings and concern for their welfare, leading to socialist parties and welfare-state systems (Bobbio, 1996 , Giddens, 1998 .
Traditional Countries. Religion plays a pivotal role in political discourse in Greece, Ireland, Israel, Poland, Portugal, and Spain, countries with a substantial religiously involved public (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Huber & Inglehart, 1995; Kissane, 2003; Mavrogordates, 2003 ). An ongoing political debate in these countries concerns the extent to which the state should be supportive of and intertwined with religious institutions or independent of the influence of institutionalized religion (i.e., church/state relations). The pro-religion position in the traditional countries is often associated with the nationalist, political right (Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Manuel, 2002; Mavrogordates, 2003; Tworzecki, 2003) .
Post-Communist Countries. Four countries share the experience both of an extended period of imposed communist rule and of a subsequent collapse of the communist regime and an opening to the West: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.
1 The swift opening of these countries to the West triggered a rise of strong traditional and right wing nationalist and religious sentiments (Markowski, 1997) . In post-communist countries, however, preserving the traditional heritage can also mean protecting the communist social order that once represented the political left (Duriez, Van Hiel & Kossowska, 2005; Thorisdottir et al., 2007; Zarycki, 2000) . Not surprisingly, given this contradiction, research suggests that the left-right dimension lacks a clear, coherent meaning for many residents of these countries (Gunther & Kuan, 2003; Whitefield, 2002) . In Poland, even party representatives sometimes reject the labels of 'left' and 'right' assigned to them (Zarycki, 2000) . The likely confusion regarding the meaning of "left-right" in these countries may yield weak associations with values that differ across post-communist countries.
Values and Political Orientations
A single dimension, such as left-right, may be insufficient to represent political competition (e.g., Rokeach, 1973) . More popular are two-dimensional models. Studies across many countries have pointed to a socio-economic dimension concerned with the extent of economic equality among people and a liberalism dimension concerned with the extent of social change and individual rights and freedoms (e.g., Janda, 1980; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) . Schwartz (1994) In linking basic values to positions on the two political dimensions, Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz & Barnea, 1998 Little attention has been paid to the motivational bases of the left-right dimension.
Building on the theoretical framework of Jost et al. (2003) , Thorisdottir, et al. (2007) examined motivations that predict left-right political orientation in 19 countries from the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS). They selected 10 of the 21 ESS items intended to operationalize the ten Schwartz basic values (Schwartz, 2003) . Thorisdottir et al. (2007) used these items to measure what they consider the two core aspects of a right orientation, traditionalism and acceptance of inequality. They measured traditionalism with one tradition item and acceptance of inequality with one universalism item. In addition, they used value items as proxies for three psychological needs that they hypothesized would predict a right orientation: needs for (a) order/rule-following (two conformity items), (b) security (two security items), and (c) openness to new experiences (two self-direction items and one stimulation item). Thorisdottir et al. (2007) did not assess whether the specific items they chose to operationalize their conceptual variables had equivalent meanings across countries. To the extent that the item meanings varied, comparing their relations with left-right orientations across countries cannot yield unambiguous conclusions. The current study, using the same database with the addition of one country, differs in two critical ways.
First, we build upon the theory of 10 basic values that the ESS PVQ-21 was specifically designed to measure. We use all of the items and operationalize all of the basic values. The value theory provides a unified, near-universal framework of human motivations that is broader in scope and more comprehensive than the constructs used by Thorisdottir, et al. (2007) . Past research that has validated the value theory in over 70 countries makes it particularly suitable for cross-national comparisons. 2 Second, we control measurement error in the values and assess their cross-national equivalence of measurement by using the sets of items that index each value rather than single items from the PVQ. Controlling measurement errors and insuring cross-national equivalence of the values are crucial for obtaining accurate estimates of relations to left-right orientations and identifying true cross-national differences.
Personal Values versus Socio-Demographic Variables
Traditionally, political sociologists viewed social structural variables, particularly the social class cleavage that emerged following the industrial revolution, as the main determinant of political orientation. This view held that voters tend to choose parties that promote their class interests (e.g., Evans, 2000; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) . The assumption that working-class voters support parties of the political left whereas middle-class voters support parties of the political right was a basic axiom in political sociology (e.g., Alford, 1967; Franklin, et al., 1992; Lipset, 1960) . Social structural variables such as occupation, levels of income and education, and membership in trade unions were used to capture "social class".
All of these variables were politically relevant, although their effects varied across countries.
As politics has grown increasingly concerned with issues that cut across traditional cleavage lines such as the environment, gender, and minority rights, the idea of class voting has been challenged (e.g., Clark, Lipset & Rempel, 1993; Franklin, et al., 1992; Inglehart, 1990) . The linkage between voting and social structure is evidently declining (reviewed in Evans, 2000 and Manza et al., 1995) . This decline exhibits a generational effect: Younger voters show more independence from group loyalties and have more instrumental and individual orientations towards politics (Franklin et al., 1992; Inglehart, 1997) .
With the individualization of politics, values may replace class and other group interests as critical bases of political orientations (Caprara & Zimbardo, 2004 (Caprara et al. 2006; Schwartz, et al. 2010 ). Thorisdottir et al. (2007) assessed effects of socio-demographic variables on the rightorientation, but they did not compare their importance to that of the value-based variables.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The current study addresses the following questions: What are the motivational bases New politics theory argues that politics is more individualized in more economically advanced nations (Inglehart, 1997) . In countries with service-based economies, a high degree of urbanization, and higher educational attainment, people are more likely to be capable of making political choices based on their own understandings and to be influenced less by their social location (Evans, 2000; Knutsen, 1997; Sniderman et al., 1991) . Using 2002 GDP per capita to index socio-economic level, the 11 liberal countries and Ireland were the wealthiest, the post-communist countries the poorest, and the traditional countries in between.
In culturally autonomous countries, individuals are encouraged to cultivate and express their unique preferences, ideas, and abilities (Schwartz, 2004 (Schwartz, , 2006a . In culturally embedded countries, individuals are encouraged to identify with the groups of which they are part, to pursue shared group goals, and to find meaning in life through their memberships. Thus, the more autonomous the culture, the more likely individuals are to rely on their own personal values in making political choices; the more embedded the culture, the more likely they are to respond in terms of group membership and social location. On the Schwartz (2004) indexes of cultural autonomy versus embeddedness, all the liberal countries are higher in autonomy than the traditional countries that are, in turn, higher than the post-communist countries.
These differences among the three sets of countries in level of socio-economic development and prevailing cultural autonomy versus embeddedness underlie the following hypothesis.
H4. Personal values explain more variance in political orientation than socio-demographic variables do in the liberal countries but less in the post-communist countries. We have no prediction for the traditional countries.
Method

Sample
Strict probability samples of the resident population aged 15 years and older in each of 20 countries from round 1 of the European Social Survey (ESS, 2002 (ESS, -2003 participated in this study (total N=35,116) . We downloaded the data from website http://ess.nsd.uib.no. Table I Values. The ESS includes 21 items to measure the 10 basic values (Schwartz, 2003) .
Two items measure each value, with three for universalism because of its broad content. Each gender-matched item presents a verbal portrait of a person in terms of his or her goals or aspirations that point implicitly to the importance of a value. For each portrait, respondents report how similar the person is to them using a 6pt Likert scale from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like me at all). Respondents' own values are inferred from their self-reported 3 The Israeli sample included only Jews and not the Arab minority that constitutes almost 20% of the population. These two groups differ so greatly in the political domain that combining them would yield confusing findings. The small size of the Israeli Arab sample precluded treating it separately. 4 Using household income would have required dropping at least 30% of the respondents in four countries and 19% overall. Subjective adequacy of income was reported by 99% of respondents. It correlated .53 with household income.
similarity to people described implicitly in terms of their values. We reversed the scores so that higher scores signify greater importance. Table II lists the items and values they measure. Table II about here We tested for equivalence of meaning of the ten values across the 20 countries by assessing metric invariance (measurement equivalence). 5 Metric invariance is necessary to insure that people understand the value scales similarly across countries and to justify crossgroup comparisons of construct correlates (Billiet, 2003; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998; Vandenberg and Lance, 2000) . 
Analyses
First, to reveal the motivational meaning of left and right in each country, we computed covariances between each of the ten values and left-right self-placement. We did this by performing a multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis (Jöreskog, 1971) for each value. This estimated the covariance between the values and political orientation in each country simultaneously, controlling for measurement error and for metric invariance (Billiet, 2003b; Steenkamp and Baumgartner, 1998; Vandenberg and Lance, 2000) .
Second, we computed several multiple-group structural equation models (Bollen 1989; Jöreskog, 1971) meaning of left-right in the post-communist countries. These analyses permitted us to estimate differences and similarities in the relations of values to political orientation across countries. Finally, to assess the relative importance of personal values versus sociodemographic variables, we regressed political orientation on a separate block of age, gender, religiosity, education, perceived household income, and trade union membership. Table I 
Results
Motivational Bases of Self-Placement on the Left-Right Political Orientation Scale
In order to test the hypotheses about variation in the motivational bases of political orientation, we compared relations of value priorities to left-right self-placement across countries. We used covariances (unstandardized correlations) rather than correlations because country differences in the standard deviations of values and political orientation do not affect covariances. Table III orientation and accounted for more variance than values in four of the six countries.
Including both values and socio-demographic variables simultaneously increased the average variance accounted for to 14%. As expected for countries in which religion plays a significant role in public life, religiosity was a stronger predictor than any single or unified value in five of the six countries (not Ireland). It was also consistently the strongest predictor among the socio-demographic variables. 7 Thus, religiosity played a more important role as a predictor of political orientation in the traditional than in the liberal countries. In sum, as hypothesized, values predicted political orientation more strongly than socio-demographic variables in liberal countries but socio-demographic variables predicted more strongly in three of four post-communist countries. In traditional countries, both values and socio-demographic variables predicted significantly, but the latter were slightly stronger.
Discussion
Varied Meanings of Left-Right Self-Placement
7 Union membership was a slightly stronger predictor in Portugal. 8 The variance explained by the unified conformity/tradition value in Poland was a little lower in this analysis than in the traditional countries analysis (.01 vs. .02) because this analysis excluded the unified universalism/benevolence value. If both conformity/tradition and universalism/benevolence are included, multicollinearity renders both insignificant.
We postulated that the meaning of left-right self-placement, as reflected in its relations to values, varies across the three sets of countries. In the liberal countries, as hypothesized, These countries, except for Ireland, fall between the liberal and post-communist countries in terms both of economic development and cultural autonomy versus embeddedness.
We placed Ireland with the traditional countries due to the centrality of religion in its public discourse and its high proportion of observant individuals. However, the findings placed Ireland closer to the liberal countries: Values predicted political orientation substantially more strongly than socio-demographic variables did, and religiosity predicted political orientation at a level similar to that of the liberal countries. Economically, Ireland actually belongs with the liberal countries, and culturally its autonomy score places it above the traditional and below the liberal countries. These national characteristics may explain why values in Ireland are considerably more important than socio-demographic variables for determining political orientation, despite the central role of religion.
As noted, religiosity was the most consistent socio-demographic predictor of political orientation, predicting right self-placement in 18 of the 20 countries. Religiosity predicted more weakly in the liberal countries, but it is striking that it contributed significantly in 10 of these 11 countries (except Denmark). Despite centuries of secularization, religiosity apparently still plays an important role in European politics. Like values and unlike the other socio-demographic variables examined here, religiosity is a subjective, psychological characteristic of individuals that can serve as a guiding principle in life. Therefore, the importance of religiosity in this study may not provide evidence for the continuing importance of social structural position as a determinant of political orientations.
We attempted to separate the effects of the psychological versus the social structural importance of religion for political orientation in a follow-up analysis. We assessed the social structural aspect of religion with responses to the membership question, "do you belong to a particular religion or denomination". We regressed left-right self-placement on values and socio-economic variables, including both religiosity and membership. Religiosity predicted significantly in 18 countries and was a stronger predictor than membership in a religion in 17 countries. In contrast, membership predicted significantly in only nine of the 20 countries.
Overall, the subjective aspect of religion (religiosity) was a substantially more important determinant of left-right self-placement than the structural aspect (membership).
Limitations and Innovations
We note three methodological limitations of the current research. First, we measured the left-right dimension using only a single-item indicator. Although this is common practice, it would be advisable to develop multiple indicators of political orientation in order to allow more control of measurement error in this key variable.
Second, using the ESS scale, we were obliged to unify some of the motivationally The findings of the current study are compatible with those of an earlier study of leftright self-placement (Thorisdottir et al., 2007) but go beyond it in several respects. By including ten values that are grounded in a well-established theory of values, we were able to provide a richer assessment of the meanings of the political orientations. Moreover, the values we used had demonstrated metric invariance across the 20 countries in the study. This is necessary to justify their use in comparing associations between values and political orientation across these countries and it permits control of measurement errors.
This study also innovated in obtaining reliable estimates of the relative importance of values and socio-demographic variables as determinants of political orientation. To do so, it used value indexes that showed the metric invariance necessary for the cross-national comparisons. Furthermore, we identified three rather than two sets of European countries (liberal, traditional, and post-communist) 
